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industrialization (EOI) strategy. This paper argues that the development strategies in 
Taiwan and China have always been a combination of ISI and EOI strategies during 
their entire miracle-creating period; far from the shift from ISI to EOI strategies, export 
promotion was used in both cases to sustain ISI, which has always been the central 
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and China, which has played a key role in supporting ISI, in particular, the government, 
the bank sector, public enterprises, and their relationship. 
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Introduction 
There is little dispute about the economic miracles created by Taiwan in the 1960s and 
1970s and China in the 1980s and 1990s, average double-digit growth figures in both 
cases were recorded for almost 20 years, which only a very few countries have achieved 
in the post-Second World War era. However, how the miracles were created has been 
subject to various debates. A conventional argument points to the shift from import-
substituting industrialization (ISI) strategy to export-oriented industrialization (EOI) 
strategy in both Taiwan and China as the key to their economic success. While the 
former emphasizes infant industry protection, aiming to replace imports with domestic 
products by building one’s own industrial capacity, the latter stresses exports and 
upgrading one’s industrial structure from labour-intensive to capital-intensive industries 
gradually as exports make the initial success. 
This study argues that the development strategies in Taiwan and China have always 
been a combination of ISI and EOI strategies during their entire miracle-creating period; 
far from the shift from ISI to EOI strategies, export promotion was used in both cases to 
sustain ISI, which has always been the central focus of development; and finally, there 
is a set of institutions in both Taiwan and China which played and is playing a key role 
in supporting ISI, in particular, the government, the bank sector, public enterprises, and 
their relationship.  
To compare Taiwan and China, they should first have a compatible basis. The 
differences between Taiwan and China are obvious. China has a much larger internal 
market. China is also a regional power if not a world power, while Taiwan is small and 
without much political and military power. However, the two cases discussed in this 
study also share some striking similarities, which are often overlooked. Taiwan of the 
1960s and 1970s was firmly ruled by the Kuomintang party (the KMT party or the 
nationalist party), which actually shares some fundamental similarities with its 
counterpart on the mainland. The KMT is also a radical and leftist party. Even in 
Taiwan, its organizational structure was still much like that of a Lennist party. The 
economic thought as a key part of the party’s founding principles was described by the 
party’s founding father – Sun Yat-Sen – as ‘socialism’ (Li 1968: 2). So it is no surprise 
to see the KMT state in Taiwan has one of the largest public sectors in the non-
communist world. Even the key leader of the KMT state, Chiang Ching-Kuo who 
became the premier of Taiwan in the early 1970s, and the president later, was trained in 
the Soviet Communist party school. All of the above discussion suggests that despite the 
differences in size and international positions, Taiwan and China have a compatible 
political and economic foundation, especially in relation to the two miracle-creating 
periods, that is, Taiwan of the 1960s and 1970s and China of the 1980s and 1990s. 
However, the differences do make Taiwan a hard case for the argument of this study. 
When market size is small, import-substituting industries can quickly fill the market 
with their products, and further expansion of such industries is therefore limited. A large 
country has a large domestic market, so it is relatively easy for such a country to engage 
in ISI. China is not only a large country but also a regional power; it seems usual for ISI 
to top the agenda for the leaders of new China in 1949 with its emphasis on the 
development of heavy industry from the beginning, and given China’s size and 
international ambition, it is also not hard to understand why the development of   2
heavy industry continued even after China opened to the world in the early 1980s. 
Taiwan has a small market; it is therefore hard to sustain ISI, so it needs an extra push 
to combine ISI and EOI strategies and keep them in place for 20 years. This study 
discusses Taiwan first, and then China. 
ISI in Taiwan’s policy transition 
The conventional view and its problems 
In standard economic analyses, Taiwan’s post-1949 industrialization is often divided 
into four phases. In the first phase, from 1949 to the late 1950s, Taiwan engaged in 
primary ISI. In an attempt to shift from imports to the local manufacture of basic 
consumer goods, the government promoted the development of textile, food, and other 
labour-intensive industries. The second phase, from the late 1950s to the late 1960s, was 
an era of EOI focusing on labour-intensive products. In this period, Taiwan’s economy 
began to take off, and rapid industrial growth was maintained for more than two 
decades. The third phase of Taiwan’s industrialization extends from the early 1970s to 
the early 1980s. Exports continued to be promoted, and began to move from labour-
intensive products to higher value-added and skill-intensive ones. At the same time, 
Taiwan engaged in so-called secondary ISI, which involved using domestic production 
to substitute for imports of a variety of capital-intensive manufactures: intermediate 
goods and capital goods. Heavy and chemical industries were promoted, along with 
several big public infrastructure projects. Finally, the fourth phase from the early 1980s 
onwards involved major government focus on the development of technology-intensive 
products. 
It has been argued that since the early 1960s, export promotion was a major feature of 
Taiwan’s economic policy, and made a great contribution to rapid economic growth. 
Various studies (for example, Gereffi and Wyman 1990) compare Taiwan’s shift to EOI 
with continued ISI in other developing areas. ISI is often found to be the most likely 
cause of economic inefficiency in domestic industries and balance of payment 
problems. Taiwan’s ISI in the 1950s has also been seen as having those problems. Thus, 
as Haggard and Pang (1994: 47) note, ‘[t]he standard interpretation of Taiwan’s postwar 
economic history identifies a relatively sharp break in policy and economic structure in 
the early 1960s’. Neoclassical economists in particular see this break as the key to 
Taiwan’s economic success (Woronoff 1986, World Bank 1993). 
The conventional explanation of this policy shift usually put forward by economists 
(such as Ho 1978, Kuo et al. 1981, Kuo 1983), but also by some others (such as Gold 
1988), points to two factors. The first involves economic needs. It is argued that as the 
Taiwanese local market is small, by the end of the 1950s it could not fully absorb 
domestically produced goods. Thus, it became necessary to develop the export market. 
The second factor explaining Taiwan’s policy shift in the early 1960s points toward 
American influence (for example, Cumings 1987). It is argued that towards the late 
1950s, the US government began to encourage Taiwan to develop through economic 
liberalization with the aim of reducing and eventually terminating economic aid. In 
1959, US official Wesley Haraldson offered the Taiwan government an eight-point 
economic programme that called for a reduction in military spending, non-inflationary   3
fiscal and monetary policies, tax reform, a uniform and realistic exchange rate, 
liberalized exchange control, efficient public utility management, an efficient banking 
system, and the sale of public enterprises to the private sector. 
However, the evidence does not match the story of a sharp policy break. For example, it 
is not clear that Taiwan dramatically reduced its import controls from the early 1960s; 
in fact, they simply became highly selective. As Wade (1988: 139) explains, ‘Taiwan’s 
tariff structure is minutely differentiated by product, with tariffs ranging from zero to 
well over 100 per cent’. Stephen Haggard (1990: 94-5) notes: ‘[e]ven neoclassical 
accounts of the country’s growth express reservations about the extent of import 
liberalization. The tariff system coupled high rates with various offsetting packages’. A 
number of Taiwan scholars went further to argue that the ISI strategy as a whole was 
pursued in parallel to the EOI strategy from the early 1960s, and export promotion was 
essentially supplementary to ISI (Hsing 1993, Ma 1994, Ch’en 1994). 
A review of policy over the 1960s supports this observation. In An Introduction to Our 
Economic Development Strategy (1987: 147), Li and Ch’en clearly state that between 
1961 and 1972 the aim of industrial development strategy was to continue pushing the 
development of import-substituting industries, and in particular to give more support to 
the development of heavy and chemical industries. In the 1960s, the first two four-year 
economic plans (1961-68) emphasized the need to develop heavy and chemical 
industries. The first plan (1961-64) stated that ‘[h]eavy industry holds the key to 
industrialization as it produces capital goods. We must develop heavy industry so as to 
support the long-term steady growth of the economy’ (Wade 1990: 87). The second plan 
(1965-68) noted that ‘[f]or further development, stress must be laid on basic heavy 
industries (such as chemical wood pulp, petrochemical intermediates, and large-scale 
integrated steel production) instead of end product manufacturing or processing’ (Wade 
1990: 87). Clearly, not only did Taiwan continue ISI in the 1960s but also went further 
to enter the secondary phase of ISI by developing heavy and chemical industries. 
Actual growth trend and figures of heavy and chemical industries in the 1960s reflect 
both the continuation of ISI and further switch to a secondary ISI. A Japanese 
economist Takeji Sasaki (1992: 30) shows that the increase in the growth rate of heavy 
and chemical industries in the period from 1961 to 1968 was the highest of any period 
between 1950 and 1985, and argues that in Taiwan the transformation from developing 
domestic markets to exploring external markets and the transformation from developing 
light industries to assisting heavy and chemical industries took place not in sequence, 
but at the same time. Figure 1 shows the weight of heavy industry in Taiwan’s 
manufacturing sector increased 9 per cent from 1961 to 1971. This is a higher increase 
than in the following ten years, when secondary ISI is conventionally believed to have 
taken place. 
 
   4















Source: Hisao (1994: 35). 
This point is crucial if we are to understand Taiwan’s industrial development as a 
whole. The conventional view focuses on export promotion because secondary ISI is 
thought to have taken place after EOI of the 1960s. However, if the development of 
heavy and chemical industries actually took place ten years earlier, then both ISI and 
EOI strategies laid a solid foundation for further industrial growth in Taiwan. Chu 
(1995: 62) argues that people trying to prove the superiority of EOI use Taiwan as an 
example but often ignore the continuation and the role of ISI strategy in Taiwan’s 
economic growth after the 1950s. This prevents their readers from fully understanding 
Taiwan’s economic policy and economic growth. Wade (1993: 162) states, ‘[i]n Taiwan 
and South Korea, however, the continuity of policy is as striking as the change, 
including the 1958-62 “liberalization” in Taiwan and the 1962-65 “liberalization” in 
South Korea’. 
If the conventional description of the policy shift of the 1960s is problematic, its 
explanations fare no better. As discussed earlier, those efforts focus on economic 
necessity and American influence. However, a close examination of Taiwan’s situation 
makes it clear that such explanations are both problematic and incomplete. The 
argument that there was an excess supply of domestic goods is often overstated. Hsiao 
(1997: 65) argues that while the prices of some domestic products dropped between 
1957 and 1958, the annual rate of reduction for most goods was within 5 per cent. 
Furthermore, prices for some goods, such as textiles, did not decrease in 1957 or 1958. 
Hsiao notes that the price reductions could be related to a general recession in world 
markets around 1957, since some of the domestically produced goods were exported 
(though in small amounts). 
The argument of American influence also weakens under close examination. The key 
piece of evidence for American influence is Haraldson’s eight-point programme of 
1959. However, Li Kuo-ting, a key technocrat at the time, points out in his reminiscence 
(Wang 1993: 119) that Haraldson’s eight points were concerned with economic   5
liberalization, but none of them emphasized export promotion. In fact, although the 
government took most suggestions of the eight-point programme, many have still not 
been effectively carried out (Wang 1993: 141, Hsing 1993: 78). What happened in the 
end was almost the opposite to the eight-point program; its suggestions were not put 
into effect and what it did not emphasize – export promotion – has been consistently 
enforced since the early 1960s, but why? 
Explaining policy change and continuity 
An explanation of both change and continuity in Taiwan’s economic decision-making 
begins with the basic need of ISI. In order to substitute imports with domestic products, 
ISI requires foreign exchange to buy technology and equipment (i.e. intermediate and 
capital goods). In the 1950s, having difficulty raising revenue domestically, the Taiwan 
government relied on US aid to finance ISI. (US economic aid to Taiwan constituted 40 
per cent of its total investment in the 1950s.) However, after a re-examination of its 
global aid policy, the US government in 1959 hinted that it would soon cut economic 
aid to Taiwan (Li and Ch’en 1987: 137). Even with massive aid, the Taiwan 
government was running budget and balance of payments deficits. The termination of 
the aid would make the situation much worse. In fact, it can be argued that without US 
aid, Taiwan could never have successfully pursued ISI. 
Hsiao Ch’uan-cheng (1997: 65) argues that the real direct reason for the policy change 
(in the early 1960s) is that the Taiwan government anticipated a possible reduction in 
US aid and therefore a possible increase in balance of payment pressure, after the US 
government re-examined its global aid policy in 1957. This is confirmed by Wei Yung-
ning, who as an economic bureaucrat personally experienced the policy shift in the early 
1960s, in his reminiscences (1994: 93). But given Taiwan’s small market size, why did 
it want to keep the expensive ISI; why not completely switch to EOI? 
The extra push for keeping ISI and EOI together came from Taiwan’s security concern. 
The military threat from mainland China to Taiwan was consistently between the late 
1940s and the late 1970s. Facing a consistent threat, the government had to build an 
economy that would strengthen their defence capacity in the long-term. Not any kind of 
economy would do; it must be one capable of sustaining a strong and autonomous 
defence industry. As an independent defence industry requires an independent economy, 
Taiwan had to develop heavy and chemical industries. Thus, from the early 1960s, the 
plan for economic independence called for independence from US aid and kept the 
focus on heavy and chemical industrialization. 
There was no way that EOI could produce an immediate growth of heavy and chemical 
industries when the exports of the 1960s were basically primary labour-intensive 
products.1 Although export promotion gradually replaced US aid as a source of foreign 
exchange, such EOI could not support economic independence. Independence required 
ISI, but with a focus on secondary ISI promoting heavy and chemical industrialization. 
                                                 
1   It is argued that Taiwan’s heavy industrialization was the result of the demand of a rapidly expanding 
export sector for intermediate and capital goods in the late 1960s (Ch’en 1994). This may be very true 
in pure economic theory, but it is certainly not what really happened. The Taiwan government pushed 
for heavy industrialization since the early 1960s, about the same time as the beginning of EOI.   6
This was the precise course the Taiwan government followed from the early 1960s, 
resulting in the rapid growth of heavy and chemical industries during the 1960s, as 
Figure 1 shows.  
In fact, EOI and ISI strategies worked hand in hand in the 1960s and 1970s. While 
exports provided foreign exchange to import-substituting industries, those industries 
developed Taiwan’s economic independence. Thus both policy change and continuity 
were simultaneously promoted by the desire for economic independence. On the one 
hand that desire favored continuity of ISI through the 1970s, and on the other hand it 
shifted the focus from economic stability and wartime preparation (primary ISI) to long-
term defence capacity (secondary ISI). In the early 1970s, the weakening of the US 
commitment to East Asian security, Taiwan’s loss of its seat in the United Nations 
(UN), and Nixon’s visit to Beijing further strengthened the Taiwan government’s 
determination to seek economic independence. In 1973, Premier Chiang Ching-kuo 
announced ten big development projects, including several major public infrastructure 
projects and industrial projects to construct steel, petrochemical, and shipbuilding 
plants.2 
As a response to the changing security environment, ‘[t]he decision to allocate 
investment resources to the development of defense industries in the early 1970s formed 
a central part of overall industrial strategy’ (Nolan 1986: 110). In order to establish a 
solid base for the defence sector, the government on the one hand promoted the 
development of infrastructural facilities such as roads and highways, and on the other 
hand enhanced the development of heavy and chemical industries. Despite a small 
domestic market and a lack of comparative advantage in the capital-intensive industries, 
the Taiwan government pushed its defence-related industrial strategy and used public 
enterprises to lead the way in developing those industries. 
The government, banking sector and public enterprises were the key institutions 
supporting Taiwan’s ISI. Taiwan has one of the largest public sectors in the non-
communist world. From 1952 to 1995, state capital consistently amounted to around 45 
per cent of gross national capital formation (CEPD 1996: 47). Up to 1990, public 
enterprises contributed 10 to 25 per cent of total government revenues (Wu 1992: 7). 
During Taiwan’s high growth period (in the 1960s and 1970s), the growth of public 
enterprises exceeded that of the whole economy. It should be especially noted that large 
public enterprises exceeded large private ones in size. According to Wade (1990: 178), 
‘[i]n 1980 the six biggest industrial public enterprises had sales equal to the fifty biggest 
private industrial concerns. Of the ten largest industrial enterprises seven are public 
enterprises; of the largest fifty, nineteen are public enterprises’. In 1981, 98 per cent of 
the enterprises in Taiwan were privately owned enterprises that each employed fewer 
than 50 employees (Chen 1995: 86). 
The importance of state capital was not only a matter of size. The state also controlled 
the vital parts of Taiwan’s economy. State capital monopolized the electricity, gas, 
water, railway and telephone utilities. It also controlled strategic or ‘upstream’ 
                                                 
2   Some people believe that the ten projects were a response to the first oil crisis. However, that 
argument is rejected by former policymakers such as Li Kuo-ting and Yeh Wan-an (Wang 1993: 216, 
Yeh and Ch’iu 1985: 193), since many of the projects, especially the industrial projects, were already 
endorsed or planned in the late 1960s.   7
industries, like petroleum refining, petrochemicals, steel and other basic metals, 
shipbuilding, heavy machinery, transport equipment and fertilizer. According to Liu and 
Huang (1993: 47), in the 1980s state capital comprised 90 per cent of the energy 
industry, 80 per cent of metals, 95 per cent of petrochemicals and 80 per cent of 
shipbuilding. Within each of those industries, public enterprises always dominated. For 
example, in the steel industry, China Steel was under direct control of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and had several thousands satellite factories. Private business and 
especially the small and medium enterprises tended to be located in downstream 
industries. Taiwan, thus, had a distinct industrial structure in which public enterprises 
dominated the upstream of production processes, while most private businesses 
occupied the downstream of production process.  
The government in Taiwan had almost complete control over the banking sector before 
the 1980s. ‘The four private banks had only five percent of deposits and branches of all 
the commercial banks in 1980, and the biggest of the four is only nominally private’ 
(Wade 1990: 161). Since the 1960s, financial institutions were also influenced by the 
capital accumulated by the ruling party (Ch’en and Chang 1991: 12). So, the banking 
sector in Taiwan was under double control – by the government and by the ruling party. 
Industrial policies in Taiwan were carried out through the allocation of financial 
resources by the government. The focus of credit allocation was on public enterprises in 
Taiwan. This should not be surprising since, as mentioned earlier, public enterprises 
were the main vehicle for government industrial policy. Wu (1992: 141) notes that 
between 1965 and 1975, among 32 enterprises receiving direct investment from 
Taiwan’s largest bank (the Taiwan Bank), 19 were public enterprises. The most 
important bodies of the government involved in industrial policy-making had little 
contact with the private sector, and the industrial plans they made were basically public 
sector plans requiring ‘little knowledge of the intentions of the private sector, not even 
investment intentions’ (Wade 1990: 277). 
The government bureaucracy is also a subject of study (Tung 1996, Cheng et al. 1998, 
Evans 1998). Although the key economic institution or often called the ‘pilot agency’, 
which makes and implements economic decisions, took various names and even forms 
over the years3, the key personnel were always there. The KMT leaders also made the 
pilot agency independent from the rest of the bureaucracy, and its power of policy 
making and implementing was therefore enhanced (Cheng et al. 1998). The pilot agency 
linked the banking sector and public enterprises, and played the key role in promoting 
Taiwan’s industrial development. 
It should be noted that, public enterprises, the banks and the bureaucracy are institutions 
as well as organizations and even political actors. To emphasize their institutional 
features is to understand the ways they operated and the ways they were linked together. 
The government, in particular the pilot bureaucracy, is clearly at the center of the 
connection. Given the socialist orientation in the KMT’s founding economic thought, 
the pilot bureaucracy favored public enterprises as the key instrument in promoting 
industrial development. The government also directed the financial resources from the 
                                                 
3   The pilot agency changed from the Economic Stabilization Board established in 1953 to the Council 
for US Aid in 1958, to International Economic Cooperation and Development in 1963, and to the 
Council for Economic Planning and Development in 1977. In addition, the Industrial Development 
Bureau established in 1970 under the Ministry of Economic Affairs is also a key economic agency.   8
banking sector to public enterprises. The experience of hyper-inflation in the last few 
years of the KMT’s rule over the mainland made Taiwan’s banking sector conservative 
about the money it lend out.4 Thus, the key institutional features of the KMT state in the 
1960s and 1970s are the linkages between the government, public enterprises and the 
banking sector, where the government was at the center of the linkages, the public 
enterprises as the key instruments of government’s industrial policy dominated the 
upstream of the production process, and supported by a conservative banking sector. 
ISI in China’s policy transition 
The origin of the combined strategy of ISI and EOI 
The nature of the transformation of China’s development strategy in the early 1980s is 
no less controversial than Taiwan’s in the early 1960s. The conventional view 
introduced early in this study is often used to describe China’s transition, that is, China 
made the switch from ISI to EOI in the late 1970s and early 1980s. China is seen 
following the footsteps of Taiwan – between the 1950s and 1970s China was engaged in 
ISI (just like Taiwan in the 1950s), and from the early 1980s China’s development 
strategy changed to EOI (just like Taiwan from the early 1960s). Some scholar further 
argues that China’s open-door policy was induced by international markets forces 
(Moore 1996 and 2002). This study argues that like Taiwan’s policy transition in the 
early 1960s, China’s policy transition was also borne out of a moment of crisis with ISI 
and the solution was not to give up ISI strategy but to combine it with an EOI strategy. 
The problem began with China’s adoption of extreme ISI strategy in the 1950s. Unlike 
Taiwan where even in the height of its ISI private sector was still a significant part of 
the economy, in China ISI was the key part of central planning system copied from the 
Soviet model, which makes normal ISI measures all become extreme – instead of infant 
industry protection, it protects all industries; instead of putting tariffs on the imports 
similar to what the infant industries produce, it puts tariffs on all imports. The key 
difference though, concerns how the ISI is financed. In the Soviet model, agricultural 
production was collectivized in order to transfer all surplus to industry, and 
nationalization of all industries and banks made sure that the government could re-
invest all possible resources into industrial development. Thus, the extreme ISI aims at 
achieving the goal of rapid industrial growth by mobilizing all domestic resources rather 
than relying on foreign assistance, which clearly reflected the international isolation and 
the urge for quick industrialization the Soviets had in the 1930s. Ironically, it did not 
take long for China to enter a similar situation. After the 1950s during which the Soviet 
Union supported China’s ISI, China was isolated and had no support from either the 
Soviet nor American camps in the 1960s and much of the 1970s. 
Although the extreme ISI created an industrial foundation for China’s modernization, it 
alone clearly had its limitations. First, China seriously lacked modern technology and 
                                                 
4   The autonomy of the central bank was further strengthened by its institutional linkages with the bank 
community, the Ministry of Finance and the planning agency, and the KMT party organization (Zhang 
2005).   9
equipment. Taiwan’s ISI in the 1950s was supported by the US with relatively advanced 
technology and equipment, while China’s extreme ISI was founded on domestic 
resources. Thus, ‘[a]n ISI could not be effective simply because there was no hard 
currency to buy the goods which were so urgently needed by China to produce import 
products’ (Li and Vinten 1997: 188). Second, in order to mobilize all available 
resources the extreme ISI had to suppress domestic consumption, which in the long run 
damaged people’s incentive to work, and the incentive problem was also worsened by 
political turmoil during the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976. 
From retrospective, solution to these two problems seems obvious. By promoting 
exports, foreign exchange can be earned to pay for the imported technology and 
equipment, and at the same time the suppression over domestic consumption can be 
lifted (at least to certain extend) which would provide people with more incentive to 
work. However, the extreme ISI had been on-going in China for three decades, and the 
old institutions of the Soviet model had become a way of life and had also created 
special interests to support it (the extreme ISI has survived in North Korea until today). 
It is difficult to change without a major crisis which could make people open to 
alternative thinking in the process of searching for solutions. 
For Taiwan, the crisis was the withdrawal of the US aid; for China, it was the campaign 
of so-called ‘leap forward by foreign means’ (yang yue jin). In 1976 Mao passed away 
and the new leadership under Hua Guofeng effectively ended the Cultural Revolution 
by putting extreme leftists (the ‘gang of four’) into jail. The welcome political change 
temporarily pushed up economic growth, in 1977 and 1978 total output of agricultural 
and industrial production grew at 11.5 per cent annually and government revenue 
increased 44 per cent (Jin 1990: 140). Hua went on to campaign for even higher growth 
rate and advocated for a ‘new leap forward in national economy’. The Ten Year Plan 
made in 1978 called for the construction and completion of 120 large development 
projects, including ten large iron and steel establishments, ten large oil fields, eight large 
coal establishments, six new rail roads, five large ports, and 30 large electricity stations 
(Gao 1993: 91). In order to meet the targets, investment in basic construction grew at 50 
per cent in 1978, number of heavy truck imported also at 50 per cent, and steel materials 
at 64 per cent (Gao 1993: 92). 
With those large investments and imports, finance became a key problem. Oil sale was 
the main way for China to earn foreign exchange in the 1970s. However, towards the 
late 1970s new oil fields were hardly found, and worse, a rapid expansion of petroleum 
output even damaged the long-term productivity of the existing fields, as Naughton 
(1996: 73) puts it, ‘[b]y the end of 1978, China’s planners faced the uncomfortable 
reality that the most successful element of their pre-1978 industrialization drive – and 
the crucial centerpiece of their plan to accelerate industrialization – was in ruins’. Since 
the government was unable to fund those large development projects with foreign 
exchange earned from oil sale, it had to borrow large amount of foreign debt, which is 
why Hua’s campaign for rapid growth is often called ‘leap forward by foreign means’. 
The direct result was the largest balance of payment deficit since the People’s Republic 
of China was founded in 1949 (Jin 1990: 141, Gao 1993: 93). Large investment also 
crossed out domestic consumption and therefore delayed people’s welfare improvement. 
By 1980, the government had to put the whole plan on hold. Some scholar regards the 
failure of the ‘leap forward by foreign means’ as the third largest economic disaster next 
to the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution (Jin 1990).   10
The economic crisis created an opportunity for reformers like Deng Xiaoping and Chen 
Yun to step into the process of economic decision making and to change economic 
strategy, which led to the open-door policy in the early 1980s. However, it is wrong to 
assume that EOI replaced ISI. Far from it, the open-door policy was born at a particular 
point of time to deal with the problem of extreme ISI. As discussed early, extreme ISI 
has key problems of lack of modern technology and equipment and disincentive for 
people to work. The ‘leap forward by foreign means’ attempted to solve the first 
problem by importing modern technology and equipment, only to generate the balance 
of payment disaster. Thus, China in late 1970s encountered a similar problem that 
Taiwan did in the early 1960s, that is, the problem of financing ISI with foreign 
exchange, and their solutions were the same, that is, promoting exports in order to 
continue ISI.  
Li and Vinten (1997: 188) argue that ‘ISI was vital in order to create the preconditions 
for a switch to EOI, and without abandoning ISI strategy, China is much closer to 
integration of the two strategies’. Other scholars go further to argue that China had a 
combined strategy all the way from the early 1980s (Long 2004, Dutta 2005). 
Concerning the rationale of export promoting, Sen (2001: 3) notes that ‘[e]xports were 
identified as the principal method for acquiring foreign exchange for the modernization 
of China’s economy’. From the government side, Vice-Premier Li Peng argued in 1987 
that the open-door policy – learning advanced technology and management experience 
from the West and obtaining foreign investment – is an important supplement to 
China’s socialist development, and export expansion, export structure improvement and 
foreign exchange earning are the key issues in China’s foreign economic operations 
(Zhang et al. 1992: 152). Clearly, the open-door policy was to play a supplementary role 
to industrial development. Li and An (2004: 381) summarized eight major industrial 
policy measures used by the government to promote industrial development up to the 
late 1990s, including central government financing and planning, empowerment of key 
industries with direct financing, preferential interest and tax rates and favorable 
financing for target industries, infant industry (trade) protection, pricing policies, 
administrative means, channeling FDI into desired industries by exercising control over 
licensing and the approval of investment projects, and various restrictions imposed on 
foreign ownership and the geographic scope of foreign-funded enterprises. 
Up to the mid-1990s, average tariff rate was 43 per cent (McKibbin and Tang 1998: 6). 
In the mid 1980s, parallel to its effort to promote EOI, the government introduced more 
import tariffs aiming at inducing domestic firms to buy the products of import-
substituting industries. Kueh (1990) argues that during the 1980s the established priority 
of promoting industrial growth through heavy industry was very much intact. Kueh 
stated that ‘heavy industrial output in the past decade or so has actually never been 
scaled down significantly in favour of agriculture and light industry for purposes of 
increasing consumers’. The output share of heavy industry was around 52 per cent of 
total national industrial output, only marginally lower than its share of 57 per cent in 
1978; and expenditure on capital construction for heavy industry as against light 
industry and agriculture was 45 per cent of the national total, also marginally lower than 
49 per cent in 1978 (Kueh 1990: 110). The seventh Five Year Plan (covering 1986-90) 
aimed to raise the output share of light industry against heavy industry and agriculture 
from 38 per cent in 1985 to 39.4 percent in 1990 while for heavy industry from 38.1 per 
cent to 39.6 per cent (CCP documents research centre 1986: 987).   11
Although exports and light industry as the main parts of EOI have been the target for 
government support since the early 1980s, the above discussion shows that the 
government continued to promote ISI by maintaining and even raising tariffs and by 
supporting heavy industry; this was particularly true in the 1980s. Moreover, EOI has 
become a key means for China to solve the main problems of ISI, that is, exports to earn 
foreign exchange and to free up ISI suppression of domestic consumption and light 
industry to produce consumer goods. 
New challenge and institutional change 
The situation related to ISI has become complicated since the early 1990s. China’s 
preparation for and eventual accession to World Trade Organization meant that a few 
traditional measures associated with ISI have to be abandoned or reduced in 
significance, including the abolishment of import quotas and license and reduction of 
import tariff. However, the Chinese government has been mobilizing various means, old 
and new, to protect and support the import-substituting industries – those capital- and 
technology-intensive ones. 
Officially, the average tariff has been reduced from 43 per cent to under 20 per cent in 
the 1990s, but according to some foreign exporters, the real tariff was still close to 40 
per cent since local governments could exempt domestic products from value added tax, 
which was always levied on imports (Breslin 1999: 1188). The government also has an 
active industrial policy to support strategic sectors. For example, by manipulating 
standard setting in video compact disc and digital video disc industries, the government 
has been consistently making effort to reduce royalty payments to oversees patent 
holders and therefore to help leading Chinese firms to secure technological leverage 
(Linden 2004). By innovating and re-innovating domestic legal treatment of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), foreign and domestic private firms, the government was 
believed to give the most favorable treatment to SOEs, which are the foundation of 
capital-intensive industry, in particular the government has been channeling foreign 
capital to set up joint ventures with SOEs, which made some scholar believe that China 
is using foreign capital to preserve, not to dismantle socialism (Huang 2003: 407-9). 
Steinfeld (2004: 1980) notes that ‘[w]hat makes Chinese industrial policy so difficult to 
comprehend, though, is that for all its focus on market-based approaches and 
comparative advantage, it also happens to have an entirely different side, one that 
embodies assumptions of heavily statist Japanese and South Korean models of the past’. 
In his study of capital investment, international trade and economic growth of China, 
Yu (1998: 76) observed that in the 1980s labour-intensive industry expanded more 
rapidly than the capital-intensive one, but in the 1990s, the situation reversed, the 
capital-intensive industry became faster due to large scale investments. Figure 2 shows 
that in terms of output growth light industry and heavy industry were neck in neck in the 
1990s with the former slightly ahead, but the trend after 1998 points to a stronger 
growth of heavy industry. 
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Source: NBS (1991-9) and NBS (2000-5). 
Like Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s, China’s combined strategy of ISI and EOI in the 
1980s and 1990s had a strong institutional support. As in Taiwan, the government, the 
banking sector and SOEs are the major institutions behind ISI in China. The 
government controls the banking sector, which provides investments to SOEs. What is 
different from Taiwan is that in China SOEs plays a larger role in the economy. 
Between 1978 and 1992, the state sectors received about 80 per cent of bank credits (Yu 
1998: 74). Industrial sales of large SOEs on average accounted for more than 40 per 
cent of national totals between 1994 and 1998, and in terms of industrial assets and 
industrial profits the shares of national totals for SOEs were 50 and 60 per cent during 
the period (Lan and Cao 2000: 49). SOEs have been the key part of China’s ISI since 
large SOEs dominates capital-intensive industry. Given the dominant role of SOEs in 
China’s economy, the government has been engaging in enterprise reform ever since the 
beginning of the reform – creating spaces for foreign, collectively-owned and private 
firms to play greater role in EOI while strengthening and reforming SOEs to led ISI. 
The reform became more urgent when about half of SOEs encountered the problem of 
non-performing loans in the 1990s. 
The solutions are privatization and corporatization with the emphasis of the latter. 
Between 1994 and 2000, almost 60,000 small to medium-sized SOEs were liquidated, 
privatized or transferred to employee ownership (Steinfeld 2004: 1980). About the same 
time, the government organized large SOEs into large enterprise groups in order to 
enhance their international competitiveness based on their economies of scale. This is 
the strategy of so called ‘grasping the large while letting go of the small’ (zhuada 
fangxiao), which aims at letting the market take over the small, medium and usually 
more inefficient SOEs while focusing on government’s effort to support large SOEs.  
Between 1991 and 1997 the number of enterprise groups increased from 55 to 120, and 
between 1996 and 1999 the number of enterprises selected as key enterprises to be   13
supported by the government increased from 300 to 520 (Nolan and Rui: 2004: 97). The 
re-organization goes well into the twenty-first century and across sectors. Over 120 car 
manufacturers are to be organized to three large conglomerates, over 300 electricity 
suppliers are being organized into five generation and two transmission groups. There 
are also plans to organize three gigantic media groups. The oil industry and airlines 
have already been or is being restructured into a few conglomerates (Chung 2003: 61). 
It is important to note that the strategy of zhuada fangxiao is the one of picking the 
winners. Large SOEs selected are often the best performer among SOEs. The profit 
rates of large and medium enterprises, among which SOEs and SOE based joint 
ventures are the main part, have been consistently higher than SOEs as whole from 
1985 to 1997 (Smyth 2000: 726). In 2000, the profits of the 515 key state enterprises 
accounted for 98 per cent of total SOEs profits, and in 2002 the profits of the 510 key 
state enterprises accounted for 104 per cent (Nolan and Rui 2004: 98). To support those 
key state enterprises and enterprise groups, the government employed various measures, 
in particular the support of the banking sector. The government has been trying to 
organize the banking sector around selected key SOEs and enterprise groups. For 
example, in 1996 a banking and enterprise cooperation agreement was signed between a 
major bank and 279 key enterprises (Smyth 2000: 722). Nolan and Rui (2004: 98-8) 
summarized government’s measures to support key state enterprises and enterprise 
groups as the following:  
extensive support from the banking sector; shelter from international 
competition behind a wall of protective tariff and non-tariff barriers; an 
independent accounting system, which removed the barriers between 
different sectors, departments and regions; permission for the 
establishment of internal group finance companies; the granting of 
import and export rights; rights to establish international joint ventures, 
and rights to float a share of equity on national and international stock 
markets. 
In the 1990s, the government also engaged in internal re-organization, and one of its 
objectives was to help re-organization of SOEs. In 1993 the State Economic and Trade 
Commission (SETC) was established to modernize the technology and management of 
SOEs. In 1998, another round of re-organization abolished almost all industrial 
ministries and associations, and made them state bureaus under SETC, which 
effectively created a super economic ministry like the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry in Japan and Economic Planning Broad in South Korea. In 2003, SETC 
was transformed into State Assets Commission and continue to supervise the 
management of SOEs. At the same time, another long standing and key economic 
institution, the State Development and Planning Commission was renamed into State 
Development and Reform Commission, continuing its role in planning and guiding 
China’s development in general and SOE’s development in particular. 
As a result of government and SOE re-organization, the foundation of ISI in China in 
the 1990s is more like that in Taiwan in the 1970s, that is, SOE based enterprise groups 
control the upstream of production processes, which basically consist of petrochemical 
and heavy industries (Nolan and Wang 1999), and the banking sector is organized to 
support those groups, while in the downstream of production processes, privatized small 
and medium SOEs together with other private firms, collectively-owned firms, and 
foreign-owned business play the dominant role.   14
Conclusion 
ISI and EOI are both present in Taiwan and China during the eras of their economic 
success. EOI in both cases began as a means to sustain ISI, which has been the 
development focus throughout the eras of their economic success. The government, the 
banking sector and public enterprises are all the key institutions supporting ISI in 
Taiwan and China, and even the way in which those key institutions are linked is similar 
between the two cases. This is not to say there are no major differences between Taiwan 
and China. Market size is a big issue we discussed earlier. Also, China is now facing an 
uncertain central-local relation domestically and the challenge of globalization 
internationally, while Taiwan had none of them 30 to 40 years ago. However, given 
those significant differences, this study still found a parallel experience between Taiwan 
and China in terms of development strategy and institutions across time. 
One could argue, however, that EOI created the economic miracles in Taiwan and 
China despite a strong presence of the ISI drive, in other words, the economic success 
could have been greater without the ISI drive. Perhaps the difference between Taiwan 
and the Southeast Asian tigers can provide part of the answer to this question. Taiwan’s 
economic success is not so much in selling more goods to the world, but to build a solid 
industrial base for further development, while lack of a solid industrial base was one of 
the key problems, which led to the fall of Southeast Asian economies during the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997. ISI is the key to industrial upgrading as the Taiwan experience 
shows and which is exactly what Southeast Asian countries have not done or not done 
enough. Now it is China’s turn to show the power of combining ISI and EOI. 
This study has both theoretical and practical implications. The argument here speaks 
well to the developmental-state literature. It shows that the state has been the key to 
economic success of both Taiwan and China. Peter Evans (1995) used the concept of 
embedded autonomy to explain the successful industrial transformation of Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan. He argued that those developmental states not only had autonomy in 
terms of economic decision making, but were also embedded in society, which made the 
policy implementation process a smooth and successful one. However, Evans did made 
a special note of Taiwan’s situation by arguing that compared with Japan and South 
Korea, the KMT state had a less extensive policy network linking private business, and 
it compensated the weakness by developing networks between public enterprises and 
private business (Evans 1995: 56). The existence of a large public sector and its relation 
to the government were clearly the main reason for the KMT state to rely less on the 
private sector when it implemented its policies. Compared with Taiwan, China should 
have more of this problem, given an even larger public sector and much smaller and 
insignificant private sector. For now, the Chinese state can get around the problem by 
exercising its direct control over SOEs and its indirect control over collectively-owned 
firms, since they together still represent the main part of China’s industrial economy. 
However, as the reform continues, the private sector will become larger and stronger. 
How much embedded autonomy the Chinese state will obtain is an important challenge, 
which lies ahead. 
What can other developing areas learn from Taiwan and China? Obviously, given 
different international and domestic situations, it is impossible for others to copy the 
development strategies and institutions of Taiwan and China. But bearing in mind that 
Taiwan and China are also very different, yet they shared many similarities in their 
development paths. Other places can learn from them, if not the whole, at least from   15
parts of their development strategies and institutions. First of all, a region must build its 
own industrial capacity, and the most direct way of doing this is to engage in ISI. 
Second, to emphasize ISI is not to overlook the importance of the market, but one has to 
realize from the Taiwan and China experiences that, export promotion should have a 
clear aim of supporting ISI. Thus, this study advocates a combined strategy of ISI and 
EOI. Finally, the government has to have some key instruments in building its industrial 
capacity. They do not have to be SOEs or/and state-owned banks, but the government 
has to have a stable influence over key strategic industries and the financial resources, 
which can be directed to those industries. 
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